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Optimal Choice in the Face of Risk: Decision Theory meets Evolution 
 
1. Introduction 
The problem of how a rational agent should choose between risky options, or 
lotteries, is a famous one. The orthodox answer to this problem, of course, is given by 
expected utility (EU) theory, first made explicit by von Neumann and Morgenstern 
(1944). EU theory teaches us that so long as an agent’s preferences over lotteries obey 
certain fairly intuitive axioms, then the agent behaves as if she is maximising the 
expected value of a utility function. The shape of the utility function then reflects the 
agent’s attitude towards risk. EU theorists generally assume that agents have concave 
utility functions for wealth, as it is an established empirical fact that humans generally 
have risk-averse preferences, i.e. prefer $x for certain to any lottery with expected 
monetary value of $x. 
 The crucial axiom in EU theory is the famous independence axiom1, the 
subject of much controversy. The axiom was originally attacked by Allais (1952), 
who regarded it as neither empirically plausible nor normatively compelling; 
subsequent experiments have found that the axiom is indeed systematically violated. 
This and other anomalies have prompted the development of various alternatives to 
EU, generically known as ‘non-expected utility theories’, which relax or replace the 
independence axiom, thus leading to maximisation of some quantity other than 
expected utility. These theories have a certain amount of empirical support, though 
none has achieved widespread acceptance. 
 Interestingly, the problem of optimal choice in the face of risk also arises in 
evolutionary biology.2 A typical problem in this area is as follows. An animal can 
either forage in a resource-rich area where there is a high risk of predation, or in a 
resource-poor area where there is a lower risk. More resources mean greater survival, 
so more offspring, so higher Darwinian fitness. Which foraging strategy will be 
favoured by natural selection? Theoretical work shows that in many circumstances, 
strategies that reduce variability in resource acquisition will be selectively 
advantageous; such behavioural strategies are often called ‘risk averse’. Empirical 
                                                 
1 This says that if an agent prefers option a to b, then for all options c and probabilities p, the agent 
should prefer the lottery (a, c; p, 1-p), to the lottery (b, c; p, 1-p). (The lottery (a, c; p, 1-p) should be 
read as ‘receive a with probability p, and c with probability 1-p’). 
2 The biological literature often uses the term ‘uncertainty’ in lieu of ‘risk’, as for example in the title 
of Frank and Slatkin (1990). This does no harm, since the economist’s distinction between risk (known 
chances) and uncertainty (unknown chances) has no obvious application to non-human animals. 
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work has confirmed the prediction that animals should often behave in a risk-averse 
way (cf. Seger and Brockmann 1987). 
 Surprisingly, there have been relatively few attempts to explicitly link the 
economic and the evolutionary literatures on risky choice, which have largely 
proceeded in parallel. (Notable exceptions include Robson 1996, Stearns 2000 and 
Orr 2007.) This is surprising because in other areas such as game theory, there has 
been significant cross-fertilisation between the economic and evolutionary 
discussions. The current paper takes a preliminary step towards redressing this 
situation, by exploring thematic and formal connections between rational choice and 
evolutionary optimality in risky situations. 
 My strategy will be to exploit an analogy between utility in rational choice and 
fitness in Darwinian evolution. (The former is the quantity that the rational agents try 
to maximise, the latter that natural selection tries to maximise.) This analogy has been 
noticed before, and has led many authors to posit a link between evolution and EU 
maximisation (Cooper 2001, Stearns 2000, Orr 2007, Gintis 2009). However I argue 
that the correct analysis of how evolution works in risky situations in fact suggests a 
link with non-EU theory. To prepare the ground for this argument, I turn first to a 
neglected though philosophically rich facet of the debate between EU and non-EU 
theory. 
 
2. EU theory, Allais’ critique, and the concept of risk aversion 
On orthodox EU theory, an agent’s attitude towards risk is fully captured by the shape 
of her utility function, as noted above. In particular, risk aversion is reflected by a 
concave utility function for wealth, i.e. diminishing marginal utility (Figure 1). The 
reason is obvious: iff the agent has risk-averse preferences, i.e. always prefers $x to 
any lottery with expected value of $x, and she maximises expected utility, then her 
utility function must be concave (by Jensen’s inequality). So risk aversion and 
diminishing marginal utility come to exactly the same thing, in EU theory. 
 
 2
utility 
money 
Figure 1: Concave Utility Function 
 
 Though the orthodox EU treatment of risk-aversion is familiar, it is not 
without its critics. The suspicion has often been voiced, originally by Allais (1952), 
that the orthodox treatment fails to recognise that there are two different reasons why 
an agent might exhibit risk-averse preferences. The first is their attitude towards 
wealth, the second their attitude towards risk. Intuitively these are different things, 
and only the latter counts as ‘real’ risk-aversion. To illustrate, consider an agent who 
prefers $5 for sure over the gamble ‘$10 if a fair coin lands heads, nothing otherwise.’ 
Such a preference might reflect the fact that $10 brings the agent less than twice the 
utility of $5; but it might not. Even if the agent’s utility function is linear in money, 
she might prefer the certainty of $5 to the gamble if she wishes to avoid risk. But 
orthodox EU theory appears only to countenance the first explanation, given that it 
defines risk-aversion in terms of diminishing marginal utility. Or so the objection 
goes. 
An amusing version of this objection was presented by Hansson (1988), who 
imagined a conversation between a professional gambler and an EU theorist. The 
gambler is offered a choice between one copy of a book for certain, and either three 
copies of the book or nothing on the flip of a fair coin. He chooses the first option. 
The utility theorist concludes that the gambler is risk-averse, for he has declined a 
gamble with expected value of 1.5 books. When presented with this reasoning, 
however, the gambler strongly denies being risk-averse – after all, he is a professional 
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gambler! Rather, he simply has no use for more than one copy of the same book, so 
sees no point in incurring the risk of getting nothing in return for a chance at winning 
three copies. This is meant to show that diminishing marginal utility and risk aversion 
are not the same thing. 
 Orthodox EU theorists regard this argument as confused, stemming from a 
mistaken conception of what a utility function is. On their view, an agent’s utility 
function is not supposed to explain their preferences, but rather just to represent them. 
So they reject the idea that concave utility is one possible explanation of risk-averse 
preferences, to be contrasted with other explanations. There simply is no conceptual 
gap between concave utility and risk averse preferences. 
This ‘representationalist’ viewpoint goes hand-in-hand with the idea that 
cardinal utility in a ‘riskless’ context makes no sense – a view explicitly endorsed by 
the architects of EU theory. An agent’s riskless utility function for wealth would tell 
us how much utility the agent gets from the definite receipt of a given amount of 
money. EU theorists argue that the only justification for cardinal utility comes from 
the representation theorem of von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944), which considers 
an agent’s preferences over risky gambles. In a purely riskless context, an agent’s 
preferences over definite monetary sums could not be used to construct cardinal utility 
a la von-Neumann/Morgenstern. Thus Savage (1954) cautioned against confusing 
von-Neumann/Morgenstern utility with “the new almost obsolete notion of utility in 
riskless circumstances” (p. 93); while Arrow (1951) called riskless cardinal utility “a 
meaningless concept” (p. 425). 
Maurice Allais (1952), an early critic of EU theory, explicitly defended the 
existence of riskless cardinal utility. He insisted that utility was psychological real, 
thus rejecting the view that an agent’s utility function is a mere representation of her 
preferences. Today, Allais is best-remembered for his discovery of the ‘Allais 
paradox’, but his broader methodological critique of EU theory went much deeper. In 
particular, Allais’ insistence on the distinction between risk-aversion and diminishing 
marginal utility, and his defence of the psychological reality of cardinal utility, raise a 
challenge for EU theory that is independent of the question of whether people in fact 
obey the EU axioms or not. 
Allais argued that a risk-averse agent will not let his choice among gambles be 
decided by the expected utility criterion; rather, he will take account of the entire 
distribution of cardinal utilities, not just the expectation. In particular, the variance of 
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the utilities will be important to the agent – for being averse to risk, he will want to 
reduce the variation in utility that he receives. Crucial to this argument is Allais’ 
assumption that riskless cardinal utility makes sense. On the EU view, which rejects 
this assumption, the idea that an agent’s choice among gambles might be influenced 
by the variance of the possible utilities makes no sense – the utility function is 
constructed precisely so that the agent cares only about its expectation. For this 
reason, most defenders of EU theory rejected Allais’ position as a confusion.3  
However, given his starting assumptions, Allais’ treatment of risk aversion is 
actually very natural.4 Suppose that an agent with existing wealth of $a is faced with a 
choice between $5 for sure (option A), and either $9 or $1 on the flip of a fair coin 
(option B). On Allais’ view, the agent will first covert the monetary sums into 
utilities, by application of her (riskless) utility function u(x); therefore, option A 
yields u(a + 5) for sure, while option B yields u(a + 9) or u(a+1) with probability ½ 
each. The agent’s risk attitude will then enter the picture. The agent may choose the 
option with the highest expected utility, i.e. max [u(a + 5), ½ u(a+1) + ½ u(a + 9)], 
but only if she is risk-neutral. She may also attend to the variance in utility attaching 
to each option. Since option A has zero variance while option B has a positive 
variance, this will count against option B if the agent is risk-averse.5 So on Allais’ 
picture, there are two quite different reasons why an agent might prefer option A to B 
– diminishing marginal utility of money, reflected in the concavity of u(x), and 
attitude towards risk, reflected in the agent’s attention to the variance as well as the 
expectation of u(x). 
 What has all this got to do with evolution? In section 4, we shall see that 
Allais’ distinction between diminishing marginal utility and ‘real’ risk aversion is 
mirrored, remarkably, in evolutionary theory. Firstly, we turn briefly to non-expected 
utility theory. 
 
3. Non-expected Utility Theory  
                                                 
3 See the example the papers by di Finetti and Morgenstern in Allais and Hagen (eds.) (1979). 
4 Essentially, this is because by ‘utility function’ Allais did not mean a von-Neumann-Morgenstern 
utility function, as his critics assumed he did. 
5 Allais (1952) did not offer precise account of how exactly the risk-averse agent would trade off 
variance in utility (or higher moments) against the expectation, a point which his critics were quick to 
pick up on. See the papers in Allais and Hagen (eds.) (1979)  
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Non-expected utility theory, developed in works by Kahneman and Tversky (1979), 
Quiggin (1982), Machina (1982), Yaari (1987) and others, was motivated primarily 
by the descriptive failure of EU theory – in particular, the fact that experimental 
subjects systematically violate the independence axiom. These theorists thus sought 
better descriptive models of how people actually make risky choices. But a secondary 
motivation behind non-EU theory was conceptual: dissatisfaction with the orthodox 
EU treatment of risk attitude, in particular the equation of risk aversion and 
diminishing marginal utility. Many non-EU theorists regard this equation as 
erroneous, following Allais.6
 To see how non-EU theory handles risk attitude, it helps to explicitly contrast 
the functional forms of the maximands in EU and non-EU theory. Consider lotteries 
of the form ($x1,….,$xn; p1,….,pn), i.e. ‘get a prize of $x1 with probability p1, of $x2 
with probability p2…etc.’. In EU theory, an agent evaluates the lotteries according to 
the criterion , where u(x∑n
1
ii)pu(x i) is the utility of prize $xi; the lottery with the 
highest value of this expression is chosen. In non-EU theory, agents choose lotteries 
according to a different evaluation criterion. The precise criterion (maximand) differs 
among different versions of non-EU theory, but can often be expressed generically as 
, where w∑n
1
ii)wu(x i is the decision weight of prize i, with = 1.∑n
1
iw  The decision 
weight of a prize need not equal the probability of getting it. This means that agents 
are maximising the weighted average of the utilities of the prizes, where the weights 
may diverge from the true probabilities.7
  Different versions of non-EU theory specify the decision weights in the above 
expression differently. Generally, the decision weight of a prize depends on its 
probability, but also on other factors (e.g. the prize’s value, the cumulative probability 
of getting a prize at least as good etc.) Many non-EU theories have been formally 
axiomatized, and they enjoy a certain amount of empirical support. For example, the 
systematic violations of the independence axiom can be accounted for quite well by 
assuming that agents are maximising some sort of non-expected utility. Other 
                                                 
6 This point comes across clearly in Yaari (1987), Quiggin (1993) and Wakker (1994). 
7 See Machina (2008) for a good survey of a number of different non-EU theories. Note that some non-
EU theories specify evaluation criteria (maximands) that do not have the generic functional form 
discussed in the text. 
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empirical features of decision-making in risky situations, such as the general tendency 
towards risk-aversion, can also be captured by non-EU theory.8
Importantly, given the generic form of the non-EU maximand, a distinction 
between risk attitude and curvature of the utility function immediately arises. To see 
this, suppose that an agent’s utility function u(x) is linear in money. In EU theory, it 
follows that the agent is risk-neutral, i.e. indifferent between $x and any gamble with 
expected monetary value of $x. In non-EU theory this does not follow, for the 
decision weights need not equal the probabilities. Depending on what the weighting 
function looks like, the agent may be risk-averse, risk-neutral, or risk-loving; nothing 
can be deduced about their risk attitude from the fact that their utility function is 
linear in money, nor vice-versa.  
This means that in non-EU theory, there are two distinct ways in which risk-
averse behaviour (i.e. preferences) can arise. One is diminishing marginal utility of 
money, the other is so-called ‘probabilistic risk aversion’ (Wakker 1994), which 
occurs when the weighting function is such as to generate aversion to risk 
independently of the shape of the utility function. Therefore, the problematic equation 
of risk aversion with diminishing marginal utility, which Allais had objected to, is 
avoided. The intuitive idea that an agent’s attitude towards risk is one thing, their 
attitude to wealth another, which EU theory cannot accommodate, finds a natural 
home in non-EU theory. 
From a formal point of view, non-EU theory arises by replacing the 
independence axiom of EU theory with a weaker axiom, thus generating a maximand 
that is not the expectation of the utility function. So EU and non-EU theories have a 
similar formal structure. Despite this, it is tempting to see significant philosophical 
differences between them. In particular, the idea that diminishing marginal utility 
constitutes a possible explanation of risk-aversion, that EU theory rejects, fits well 
with non-EU theory. More generally, Allais’ ideas that utility is psychological real, 
that riskless cardinal utility makes sense, and that a rational agent might consciously 
attend to the dispersion of utilities as well as their expectation, all make good sense 
from a non-EU perspective, though nothing in the mathematics strictly requires them 
(cf. Wakker 1994). 
                                                 
8 See Harless and Camerer (1994), Hey and Orme (1994) for discussion of the empirical support for 
and against the various non-EU theories. 
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In the following section, I argue that the opposition between EU and non-EU 
theories finds an intriguing parallel in evolutionary biology.  
 
4. Evolution and Rational Choice 
Evolution by natural selection is commonly viewed as a maximising process, in which 
‘nature’ chooses the phenotypic variants that are best suited to the environment, or 
fittest. In this metaphorical sense, a ‘choice’ is made whenever natural selection 
operates. Moreover, and non-metaphorically, the actual choice behaviour of animals 
(including humans), is very likely the product of natural selection, at least in part. For 
both these reasons, it is natural to expect connections between choice theory and 
Darwinian evolution.  
 The notion of ‘choice behaviour’ as applied to animals requires only 
behavioural plasticity, not sophisticated cognition. Thus some amphibians and fish 
must choose whether to produce many large eggs or a few small ones; some plants 
must choose whether to germinate in a given year or wait for a better one; some 
animals must choose how long to forage in a given area before searching for a new 
area, and so-on. This is standard usage in behavioural ecology.  
 Clearly, many of the choices faced by animals involve an element of risk, in 
that the consequences of any particular choice for reproductive success are stochastic. 
For example, suppose an animal may adopt one of two possible foraging strategies, A 
and B. Strategy A is ‘safe’ – it guarantees the animal 5 units of food in a given time 
period. Strategy B is ‘risky’ – it brings either 9 units of food or 1 unit per time period, 
depending on whether the animal has to flee a (non-lethal) predator. Suppose that the 
probability of encountering a predator is ½. So in effect, the animal must choose 
between 5 units of food for certain, and a lottery that brings either 9 units or 1 unit 
with equal probability. Note that both strategies yield the same expected amount of 
food, namely 5 units. Conceptually, this is similar to a standard rational choice 
problem. It is then natural to ask: which strategy will be favoured by natural selection, 
i.e. which is evolutionarily optimal? Will evolution favour risky or safe strategies? 
 A more general line of enquiry suggests itself. Given that animals face risky 
choices, and given that their choice behaviour is influenced by natural selection, we 
can ask what sort of choice behaviour we should expect to find. For example, will 
evolution produce creatures that obey expected utility maximisation? It is natural to 
think that the answer should be ‘yes’, on the grounds that evolution generally 
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produces ‘well-designed’ creatures who behave as if they are rationally pursuing a 
goal; and EU maximisation is arguably a canon of rationality. This suggestion is 
merely programmatic; however, a number of authors have tried to show that EU 
maximisation can be given an evolutionary foundation (e.g. Cooper 2001, Gintis 
2009, Stearns 2000, Orr 2007). 
 I maintain that in fact, the link is strongest between evolution and non-
expected utility theory, both formally and conceptually. This is so for two related 
reasons. Firstly, the distinction between diminishing marginal utility and ‘real’ risk 
aversion, which non-EU theory recognises, finds an analogue in evolutionary theory. 
Secondly, the characterization of evolutionarily optimal behaviour in the face of risk 
yields a maximand which is structurally similar to the generic non-EU maximand. I 
expand on both points below. 
 
5. Evolution, Risk-Aversion, and Non-Expected Utility 
Consider again the choice between the two foraging strategies A and B above, i.e. 5 
units of food for sure (A), and either 1 or 9 units with probability ½ each (B). Both 
strategies have the same expected value, but it does not follow that they are 
evolutionarily equivalent. On the contrary, under many conditions organisms using 
the risk-averse strategy (A) will enjoy a selective advantage, and thus ultimately 
dominate the population. Interestingly, this selective advantage may arise for two 
different, logically independent reasons (cf. Frank and Slatkin 1990, Robson 1996, 
Okasha 2007.) 
The first reason is straightforward: reproductive output may scale concavely 
with food intake, i.e. additional food leads to additional offspring, but with 
diminishing returns (Figure 2). Empirically this is quite plausible, and is a common 
assumption in optimal foraging models. It implies that to maximise expected 
reproductive output, an animal should exhibit risk aversion in choosing between 
lotteries with food prizes. So an animal employing strategy A will have a higher 
expected reproductive output than one employing B; this constitutes a selective 
advantage and will lead A to dominate the population, ceteris paribus. This is the first 
and most obvious mechanism by which risk aversion may evolve by natural selection.  
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number of 
offspring 
food or energy 
Figure 2: Concave Fitness Function 
 
The second reason is more subtle; it arises because in certain evolutionary 
contexts, strategies that lead to a high variance in reproductive output are intrinsically 
disadvantageous (cf. Gillespie 1977). In such contexts, expected reproductive output 
is not the sole determinant of evolutionary success, and so is not the correct measure 
of Darwinian fitness; the variance must be taken into account too. This means that 
strategy A will have an evolutionary advantage over B, quite apart from 
considerations of diminishing returns. Even if reproductive output is linear in food 
intake, the advantage will accrue. 
One way to understand this is to invoke the well-known ‘geometric mean 
principle’ (cf. Lewontin and Cohen 1969, Houston and McNamara 1999). Under 
certain sorts of environmental stochasticity (described below), the appropriate 
measure of Darwinian fitness is the geometric, not the arithmetic, mean of 
reproductive output. (This is intuitive since reproduction is a ‘multiplicative’ process.) 
In the above example, if predators are present in some time periods and absent in 
others, each with probability ½ and independent across periods, then the geometric 
mean principle applies. Supposing for simplicity that x units of food implies x 
offspring, i.e. reproductive output is linear in food, it follows that strategy A has a 
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geometric mean output of 5 offspring per time period, while B has 3.9 Therefore type 
A will dominate the population.  
These two evolutionary reasons why risk-averse behaviour may be selectively 
favoured are logically independent. The first involves a concave relation between 
resources (e.g. food or energy) and reproduction; the second arises because of the 
intrinsic disadvantage of having a high variability of reproductive output. So the 
former works by raising the expected output, the latter by reducing the variance of 
output. The former mechanism may be termed ‘diminishing marginal output’, the 
latter ‘variance reduction’.10
This distinction is analogous to the distinction discussed in section 2, between 
two reasons why a rational agent might exhibit risk-averse preferences, namely a 
genuine aversion to risk and mere diminishing marginal utility. For diminishing 
marginal output is analogous to diminishing marginal utility – both involve a concave 
relation between a resource (food or money), and some thing of value (utility or 
offspring). (Compare Figures 1 and 2.) It is then natural to suggest that ‘genuine’ risk 
aversion is analogous to variance reduction – both constitute an intrinsic reason why 
risk-averse behaviour may be favoured, over and above considerations of diminishing 
marginal returns. Of course, in one case the ‘favouring’ is done by the rational agent, 
in the other by natural selection.  
This argument can be bolstered by considering John Gillespie’s well-known 
analysis of evolution in stochastic environments. In such environments, the 
reproductive output of a genotype (or strategy) is a random variable. Gillespie (1977) 
emphasised that natural selection will penalise genotypes that lead to high variability 
in reproductive output. He showed that under fairly general assumptions, selection 
will favour the genotype which maximises an expression of the form: 
Expected [reproductive output] – f [Var(reproductive output)] 
where f is an increasing function. (The precise function depends on the exact pattern 
of stochasticity; see section 6.) Gillespie’s formula highlights the potential trade-off 
                                                 
9 Recall that if two random variables have the same arithmetic mean, the one with the lower variance 
will have the higher geometric mean. 
10 Frank and Slatkin (1990) recommend the term ‘risk aversion’ for the former and ‘bet hedging’ for 
the latter. However this recommendation has not been widely heeded; moreover, some authors use 
‘bet-hedging’ to refer to one particular way of reducing variability in output, namely using randomised 
strategies. So I will continue to use ‘risk aversion’ to mean an animal employing a strategy like A over 
one like B; on this usage, the two mechanisms described above are alternative reasons why risk-
aversion might be favoured by natural selection. 
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between the expectation and the variance of reproductive output – the type with the 
highest expected output may not be the fittest, if the variance is too high. Note the 
analogy between Gillespie’s formula and Allais’ discussion of rational behaviour in 
the face of risk. As we saw, Allais argued that the rational agent might care about the 
variance of the utilities, not just its expectation, and that a dislike of risk might lead 
them to prefer a lottery with lower expected utility, if its variance was lower too. If 
‘reproductive output’ is replaced with ‘utility’, Gillespie’s formula captures precisely 
Allais’ conception of what genuine risk-aversion amounts to. So Allais’ idea that risk 
attitude isn’t captured by the shape of an agent’s utility function has a close 
evolutionary analogue. 
This suggests a link between the evolutionary theory of optimal behaviour in 
the face of risk and non-EU theory – for as we have seen, the latter recognises Allais’ 
distinction between risk-aversion and diminishing marginal utility, unlike EU theory. 
The previous paragraph provides some evidence for such a link. Another, more direct 
piece of evidence is the fact that in experiments on the choice behaviour of rats, 
violations of the independence axiom of EU theory have been discovered; see Kagel, 
Battalio and Green (1995) for details. Moreover, the pattern of violations the rats 
exhibited were broadly similar to the violations that humans exhibit. This suggests a 
common evolutionary origin for the animal and human behaviours. Since non-EU 
theory was partly designed to account for violations of the independence axiom, and 
since the pigeon’s choice behaviour has presumably been fashioned by natural 
selection, this bolsters the link between evolution and non-EU theory. 
As discussed in section 3, non-EU theory was motivated by two different 
concerns: first, to account for observed violations of the EU axioms, and second, to 
avoid the problematic equation of risk aversion with diminishing marginal utility. It is 
remarkable that both of these find analogues in evolutionary biology. Animals as well 
as humans violate the EU axioms, and the analysis of evolutionarily optimal 
behaviour in the face of risk yields an analogue of the distinction between ‘true’ risk 
aversion and diminishing marginal utility. 
This argument can be bolstered further, and made more precise, by drawing on 
another well-known analysis of evolution in stochastic environments, due to J. 
McNamara (1995). Consider lotteries of the form:  
(1 unit of food...n units of food; p1…pn) where ∑pi = 1.  
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(This should be read as ‘get 1 unit of food with probability p1, 2 units with probability 
p2 etc.) Each lottery can be thought of as implemented by a particular behavioural 
strategy, or genotype, of an animal. Let v(xi) equal the reproductive output, or number 
of offspring, an animal will get from consuming xi units of food; we assume that v(xi) 
is an increasing function of x. So the expected reproductive output an animal will get 
from choosing a given lottery (i.e. engaging in the behaviour associated with the 
lottery) equals∑ . One might think that selection will favour the behaviour 
with the highest value of this quantity, but this ignores variance discounting. The 
behaviour with the highest expected output may have a high variance, which as we 
have seen will often constitute a selective penalty.  
n
1
ii)pv(x
McNamara (1995) shows that the actual maximand of natural selection, in the 
above model, equals , where w∑n
1
ii)wv(x i is the weight of outcome xi. This expression 
is the weighted average of reproductive output, but it is not the expectation, because 
the weight of an outcome does not in general equal its true probability. McNamara 
provides an explicit formula for calculating the weights; the details of his argument 
are explained in section 6. For the moment, what matters is the striking similarity 
between the maximand in this evolutionary model and the generic non-EU evaluation 
criterion of section 4. We saw that in non-EU theory, the preferred lottery is the one 
that maximises the weighted average of the utilities of the prizes, where the weights 
do not equal the true probabilities. Similarly, evolution favours the lottery that 
maximises the weighted average of reproductive output, where the weights aren’t the 
true probabilities. It is easy to see that with suitable weights, low-risk lotteries may do 
best according to this maximand, even if v(xi) is linear in x. 
This shows that there really is a close connection between non-EU theory and 
evolutionary theory, in respect of the relation between diminishing marginal returns 
and risk-aversion. Just as concavity of the utility function is one reason, but not the 
only one, why low-risk lotteries may score highly on the non-EU evaluation criterion, 
so concavity of the reproductive output function v(xi) is one reason, but not the only 
one, why low-risk lotteries may score highly given the maximand of McNamara’s 
evolutionary model.  
To summarize, a number of lines of argument point to a link between 
evolutionary theory and non-EU theory. Firstly, the distinction between ‘genuine’ 
 13
risk-aversion and diminishing marginal utility, that the non-EU theorists insist on, has 
an evolutionary analogue. Secondly, there is direct evidence that animals and humans 
violate the independence axiom, in similar ways. Thirdly, Gillespie’s formula for 
fitness in stochastic environments, which formalises the notion of variance 
discounting, is strikingly analogous to Allais’ conception of genuine risk aversion. 
Fourthly, McNamara’s analysis shows that the evolutionarily optimal strategy, in a 
risky environment, has the same mathematical form as the rational choice optimum 
when calculated according to the non-EU evaluation criterion.  
Finally, it is perhaps significant that the utility / fitness analogy works best on 
an Allais-like conception of utility, rather than the orthodox EU conception. Recall 
that Allais believed in ‘riskless’ cardinal utility, where EU theorists held that in the 
absence of risk, utility can only be ordinal. In a biological context, it is clearly untrue 
that in the absence of risk, Darwinian fitness is only ordinally measurable; on the 
contrary, fitness is usually treated as either cardinal or ratio-scale measurable, whether 
or not the evolutionary model incorporates stochastic elements.11 So in this respect 
too, the link is strongest between evolution and non-EU theory. 
 
6. Evolution in Stochastic Environments 
The previous section mentioned a number of results from evolutionary theory, but did 
not explain their derivation. This section provides more detail, and shows how to 
reconcile the McNamara and Gillespie results.  
 Consider again the choice between the two foraging strategies A and 
B, i.e. 5 units of food of certain, versus 1 or 9 units with probability ½ each. Assume 
that strategies are genetically hard-wired, and perfectly inherited. Assume further that 
reproductive output is linear in food, so A and B are in effect lotteries over offspring. 
Suppose a large population initially contains organisms of both types. How will it 
evolve? Both types have an arithmetic mean of 5 offspring per time period; but type B 
has a lower geometric mean, due its higher variance. Can we apply the geometric 
mean principle and conclude that type A is fitter, so will dominate the population?  
It depends. We need to ask whether the risk faced by the type B organisms is 
‘aggregate’ or ‘idiosyncratic’.12 If each type B organism faces an independent 50-50 
                                                 
11 See Okasha (2009) for discussion of the appropriate measurement scale for biological fitness. 
12 ‘Aggregate’ versus ‘idiosyncratic’ risk is economic terminology; in biology, the same distinction is 
often captured by contrasting ‘environmental’ and ‘demographic’ stochasticity. 
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gamble on 1 or 9 offspring, i.e. there is a separate coin flip for each organism, then the 
risk is purely idiosyncratic. If on the other hand a single fair coin flip determines 
whether all the type Bs leave 1, or all leave 9, then the risk is purely aggregate.  
The weather is a standard example of aggregate risk – a very harsh winter may 
kill all members of a population. So if there is a 5% chance of a very harsh winter in a 
given year, then all organisms face a 5% chance of leaving no offspring. By contrast, 
predation may well give risk to idiosyncratic risk. Each organism may have a 5% 
chance of getting killed by a predator in any year, and this chance may be independent 
across organisms. Purely aggregate and purely idiosyncratic risk are opposite ends of 
a spectrum; most real cases will lie somewhere in between. 
To see how the aggregate / idiosyncratic distinction affects the applicability of 
the geometric mean principle, suppose firstly that the risk facing the type Bs is purely 
idiosyncratic. How will our population evolve? Over a single time period, each type A 
will leave exactly 5 offspring. Each type B will leave either 1 or 9 offspring, with 
probability ½ each. Since the population is large, then the Bs will leave approximately 
5 offspring per capita, by the law of large numbers. So there will be no (or minimal) 
evolutionary change – the A and B types are equally fit, leaving 5 offspring per capita 
per period. (Essentially, large population size cancels out the idiosyncratic risk.) The 
correct measure of fitness, in this model, is simply expected reproductive output – 
variance is not relevant. So the geometric mean principle does not apply. Note that 
this argument does not work if the population size is small. 
Now suppose the risk is purely aggregate. As before, each type A leaves 
exactly 5 offspring. With probability ½, all the Bs leave 9 offspring each, and with 
probability ½, they all leave 1 each. So each period, the A’s multiply their numbers by 
5, and the Bs by either 1 or 9, with probability ½ each. Assume that the aggregate risk 
faced by the Bs is independent across periods. Now, there will be evolutionary change 
– the As have an advantage. To see this, consider a ‘typical’ sequence of 10 years for 
the Bs: {9, 1, 9, 9, 1, 1, 9, 9, 1. 1}. The product of these numbers is far less than 510, 
so in the limit, the As will take over the population.13 The geometric mean is the right 
measure of fitness in this case, and the B type has the lower geometric mean output, 
owing to its greater variability. 
                                                 
13 Appealing to a ‘typical’ sequence is purely a heuristic; some simple limit calculations, omitted here, 
generate the result that the As will take over; see Houston and McNamara (1999) or Robson (1996).   
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A different (though equivalent) perspective on this case is useful (cf. Robson 
1996). At any point in the future, the expected number of As and Bs in the population 
is the same. But this does not mean that the two types are equally fit, for what matters 
to evolution is relative success, not absolute success. And crucially, the expected 
proportion of type As exceeds the expected proportion of type Bs, at every point in 
time. For example, after one period the ratio of As to Bs will be either 5/9 or 5/1, with 
probability ½ each; so the expected ratio is 2.7: 1. Essentially, the high variability in 
output of the type Bs reduces the expected fraction of the population that they will 
comprise. In the limit, this means that type A will dominate the population. 
Gillespie (1977) provided two useful (approximate) formulae for determining 
the fitness of a type, under the extremes of purely idiosyncratic and purely aggregate 
risk. If the risk is purely idiosyncratic risk, a type’s fitness is given by: 
Exp [reproductive output] – Var [reproductive output] / N 
where ‘N’ is the population size. As N gets larger and larger, the second term gets 
smaller and smaller, so the expectation becomes the major determinant of fitness and 
the variance irrelevant.14 This explains our first case above. If the risk is purely 
aggregate, then a type’s fitness is given by: 
Exp [reproductive output] – Var [reproductive output] / 2. 
This shows that variability in output is heavily penalised when the risk is aggregate, 
as we saw in our second case. 
 Gillespie’s formulae cover the two extreme cases, but it would be good to 
have an analysis that applies when the risk is partially idiosyncratic and partially 
aggregate. McNamara (1995) and Robson (1996) provide such an analysis. In their 
model, there is a set of possible environmental states S, and a probability distribution 
over S; the state varies from year to year, with independence across years. There are a 
number of different types of organism. The reproductive output of an organism 
depends on both its type and the state of the environment. Consider a given type, 
called ‘A’. In any given environmental state s, each organism of type A faces an 
independent lottery over offspring. So for example, in state s, each type A organism 
might have a ½ chance of leaving 4 offspring and an ½ chance of leaving none. Let 
rA(s) equal the mean reproductive output of type A in environmental state s, averaging 
over idiosyncratic risk. Let p(s) equal the probability that the environment is in state s. 
                                                 
14 Many evolutionary analyses assume an infinite population; in this case, the second term in 
Gillespie’s formula goes to zero, under purely idiosyncratic risk. 
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One might think that natural selection will favour the type with the highest 
value of ∑ , i.e. the arithmetic mean over states of the type’s expected 
reproductive output. But this is incorrect. Since the environment state varies from year 
to year, with independence across years, the geometric mean over states is the 
relevant quantity. Maximising the geometric mean is equivalent to maximising its 
logarithm; since the logarithm of the geometric mean of a random variable equals the 
arithmetic mean of its logarithm, it follows that selection will maximise 
. The type with the highest value of this expression will dominate the 
population. This expression thus provides a measure of Darwinian fitness, in a very 
general model which combines both idiosyncratic and aggregate risk. 
s
r(s)p(s)
∑
s
r(s)p(s) log
Interestingly, maximisation of the above expression may require the type to 
play a mixed strategy, i.e. to randomise over pure strategies. This is quite intuitive. 
Suppose that each pure strategy leaves zero offspring in some environmental state, 
and that each state obtains with non-zero probability. Then, pure strategies are 
doomed to extinction in the long run. Randomising over pure strategies, or ‘bet-
hedging’ as biologists call it, is the optimal thing to do in such a circumstance.  
 It is easy to see that the McNamara / Robson model is broadly compatible with 
Gillespie’s formulae. Since the logarithmic function is concave, the maximand in the 
McNamara / Robson model,∑ , implies that a type with a high variance in 
reproductive output (across states) will be at a disadvantage compared to a type with 
the same expected value of r(s) but less variance. Variance-discounting of the sort 
embodied in Gillespie’s principles thus falls directly out of the McNamara/Robson 
analysis. In the case where all the risk is idiosyncratic, i.e. r(s) = r is constant across 
all states s for each type, the McNamara/Robson model implies that the fittest type 
maximises log r, or equivalently r itself, i.e. expected reproductive output. This is 
compatible with Gillespie’s formula because McNamara/Robson are assuming a very 
large population, so the first term in Gillespie’s formula will dominate. 
s
r(s)p(s) log
McNamara (1995) provides an alternative, equivalent characterisation of the 
fittest type, in this model. He shows that the type which maximises ∑
s
r(s)p(s) log will 
thereby maximise ∑
s
(s)*r(s)p , where p*(s) is a distortion of the true probability 
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distribution over states. The latter expression is thus the weighted average of expected 
reproductive success, where the weights differ from the true probabilities. The 
distorted probability distribution p*(s) is related to the true probability distribution 
p(s) by the formula p*(s) ∝ p(s) / r (s), where r (s) is the average value of r(s) in the 
whole population, i.e. average fitness. Essentially, therefore, fitness maximisation 
requires underweighting environmental states in which the population as a whole does 
well, and overweighting states in which it does badly, relative to the state’s true 
probability of occurrence.15  
 
7. Evolution of Irrationality? 
So far, we have highlighted a thematic link between evolution and non-EU theory. 
Does it follow from this that we should expect the Darwinian process to produce 
humans with non-EU preferences, e.g. ones that violate the independence axiom? If 
so this would be a striking conclusion, for it would arguably amount to the ‘evolution 
of irrationality’, given the widespread view that the EU axioms are normatively 
compelling. It might also explain why those axioms are routinely violated by 
experimental subjects. 
 This issue was addressed by Robson (1996), who uses his evaluation criterion 
(above) to argue that in the presence of aggregate risk, evolution may indeed favour 
irrational behaviour; a similar argument is made by Houston, McNamara and Steer 
(2007). To understand Robson’s argument, suppose that individuals face lotteries of 
the form (1 unit of food….n units of food; p1….pn). Assume that food translates into 
reproductive output according to a positive function v, assumed linear for 
simplicity.16 So an individual’s behaviour, i.e. choice of lottery, induces a gamble 
over numbers of offspring. Robson then applies his evaluation criterion to determine 
the evolutionarily optimal lottery. He then asks: suppose evolution were trying to 
design a human with preferences over lotteries, such that they always prefer lotteries 
which are nearer the evolutionary optimum. What sort of preferences would the 
human have? Would those preferences have an EU representation, or not? 
                                                 
15 This highlights the important fact that with aggregate risk, there is automatically a game-theoretic or 
strategic aspect to an individual’s optimal choice of lottery; see Robson (1996), McNamara (1995) and 
Houston and McNamara (1999) for discussion of this point. 
 
16 This assumption is for expository convenience only; in Robson’s own argument it is not used. 
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 The answer depends on the nature of the risk. With purely idiosyncratic risk, 
then EU maximisation falls directly out of evolutionary optimality, as Robson notes. 
In that case, by simply equating utility with number of offspring (or food, given our 
linearity assumption), we generate the result that an EU maximising individual will 
make the evolutionarily optimal choice. This follows from the fact that with purely 
idiosyncratic risk, evolution selects for the maximisation of expected reproductive 
output, as we saw above. Define utility as reproductive output, and EU maximisation 
will therefore coincide with evolutionary optimality. 
 What about purely aggregate risk? Robson does not discuss this case, but it is 
straightforward to show that if utility is equated with the logarithm of offspring 
number (or food, given our linearity assumption), then agents who maximise EU will 
make evolutionarily optimal choices. That this is so can be seen by inspecting the 
NcNamara/Robson evaluation criterion∑
s
r(s)p(s) log . With purely aggregate risk, 
r(s) is simply the actual number of offspring left by an organism of a given type in 
environment s (rather than an average across idiosyncratic risk). Therefore, natural 
selection maximises the expectation of the logarithm of reproductive output. Define 
utility as the logarithm of reproductive output, and EU maximisation will again 
produce evolutionary optimality.  
 This result is interesting, in that it appears to supply an evolutionary 
foundation for the idea of logarithmic utility – an idea with a famous history in 
decision theory.17 A number of authors, including Sinn (2003) and Stearns (2000) 
have been impressed with this fact. However, the result holds only for the case of 
purely aggregate risk, which is a special circumstance – a point that Sinn and Stearns 
do not mention. With any combination of aggregate and idiosyncratic risk, the result 
does not go through. 
 What does happen when aggregate and idiosyncratic risk are combined? In 
this case, EU maximisation cannot be so simply recovered. This should not be 
surprising, given McNamara’s characterisation of the evolutionarily optimal choice as 
a weighted average of reproductive output, using biased probabilities. Another way to 
see this is to note that, in the combined case, the evaluation criterion∑
s
r(s)p(s) log is 
                                                 
17 Daniel Bernoulli (1738), one of the founders of EU theory, proposed logarithmic utility as a way of 
avoiding the famous St. Petersburg paradox. 
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an expectation over environmental states of log r(s), but r(s) is itself an expectation 
(over idiosyncratic risk); so all the summation terms cannot be brought to the left-
hand side. As Robson (1996) points out, this means that the evaluation criterion is not 
a function of the marginal probabilities facing a given individual – which immediately 
implies that we are outside the ambit of EU. 
 A simple example may help make this clear. Consider an individual trying to 
evaluate the lottery ‘9 offspring or 1 offspring, probability ½ each’. The lottery that 
the individual faces may be ‘realised’ by many different combinations of aggregate 
and idiosyncratic risk; as specified, the lottery is compatible with the risk being purely 
idiosyncratic, purely aggregate, or some combination. And crucially, the 
NcNamara/Robson evaluation criterion applies to these realizations, not to the 
marginal lottery. (It is impossible to apply the criterion directly to the lottery – there is 
not enough information.) Further, the different realizations will all receive different 
evaluations, i.e. have different consequences for Darwinian fitness. But from the point 
of view of the individual decision maker, they are all equivalent. So evolutionary 
optimality and individual rationality part ways.  
 A neat example from Robson (1996) highlights the consequences of this 
parting of ways. Consider two lotteries A and B. In A, then with probability ½ 
everyone in the population leaves 9 offspring, and with probability ½ everyone leaves 
1. In B, then with probability 1 everyone in the population has a 50:50 chance of 
leaving 1 offspring or 8.5 offspring, with independence across all population 
members. Consider the situation from the perspective of a single individual in the 
population. That individual must surely prefer A to B, for A stochastically dominates 
B, i.e. for every number of offspring, the probability of having that number is higher 
under A than B. However, on the McNamara/Robson evaluation criterion, B scores 
higher than A.18 Natural selection will favour individuals who choose B over A, even 
though this choice seems irrational. 
 Robson uses this example to highlight a violation of stochastic dominance; but 
in fact, this also means that the independence axiom of EU theory is violated too – 
since stochastic dominance is a logical consequence of independence. This appears to 
show quite generally that evolution can lead to violations of EU maximisation and 
thus (arguably) to irrationality. 
                                                 
18 The evaluation is B is log [(½).1 + (½).8.5] = log 4.75. The evaluation of A is ½ log 9 + ½ log 1= ½ 
log 9, which is less than log 4.75.  
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 However, this conclusion rests on an implicit assumption, namely that an 
individual’s utility function must depend only on their own reproductive output. 
Modulo this assumption, it is certainly true that no utility function exists such that an 
EU maximiser will be led to make evolutionarily optimal choices, except in the 
limiting cases of purely idiosyncratic and purely aggregate risk. But what if we relax 
this assumption? Curry (2001) has argued that EU maximisation can then in fact be 
recovered; his argument draws on Grafen (1999), which itself draws on McNamara 
(1995). 
 The Curry/Grafen point is simple. It derives from the fact, discussed above, 
that the NcNamara/Robson evaluation criterion can equivalently be characterized as 
, where p*(s) is a biased probability distribution. Recall that p*(s) is 
given by the relation p*(s) ∝ p(s) / 
∑
s
(s)*r(s)p
r (s), i.e. the biased distribution shifts probability 
mass onto states where the population as a whole does badly (has low r (s)), and away 
from states where the population as a whole does well, relative to the true distribution. 
Re-arranging, the criterion can be written as ∑
s
p(s) (s)rr(s)/ . This is an expectation 
over environmental states of the quantity, [r(s)/ r (s)], which is the relative 
reproductive output of a given type in state s, i.e. its output divided by average 
population output in that state. So the maximand of natural selection is expected 
relative fitness.  
 Crucially, this means that the evaluation of a lottery is after all a function of 
the marginal probabilities facing an individual, so long as we mean the marginal 
probabilities of having a given relative reproductive output, rather than absolute 
output. Moreover, the criterion is linear in those probabilities – so by suitable choice 
of utility function, EU maximisation must be restorable. The choice is not hard to 
find: simply let an individual’s utility depend on their relative number of offspring 
(relative to the population average). If the individual obeys EU maximisation, they 
will then be led to make evolutionarily optimal choices. 
 It may seem puzzling that the same evolutionary model can apparently imply 
that EU maximisation is satisfied and that it is violated. How can this be? In fact there 
is no contradiction here. When Robson argues that EU maximisation is violated, and 
when Curry argues that it is not, they are (in effect) using different state spaces to set 
up the decision problem. Robson is assuming that the basic prizes, from which the 
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lotteries are constructed, are specifications of how many offspring an individual 
leaves. It then follows that the evolutionarily optimal preferences over lotteries will 
violate the EU axioms. Curry is assuming that the basic prizes are specifications of 
how many offspring an individual has relative to the population average. It then 
follows that the evolutionarily optimal preferences over lotteries will satisfy the EU 
axioms. In a way, this is an instance of the familiar moral that apparent irrationalities 
of choice can often be removed by enlarging the state space. 
 What then of the original question: will evolution tend to produce creatures 
that obey EU maximization? No definitive answer emerges. Curry’s argument 
suggests that in theory the answer is ‘yes’; but in practice, it may be extremely hard to 
produce people with utility functions that depend suitable on relative reproductive 
output. This is because one’s relative output depends not only on how many offspring 
one has oneself, but also on how many others in the population have, so is extremely 
hard to keep track of. It may be that producing creatures that care about their absolute 
number of offspring (or things that promote it such as food, sex etc.), is the best that 
evolution can do, even though it would be better to produce organisms who cared 
directly about their relative number. If that is so, then we should expect to see 
violations of EU maximisation.  
 A loose analogy of the situation is this. Consider the one-shot Prisoner’s 
dilemma played among (human) relatives. If an individual cares only about their own 
payoff, then defection is the rational choice. But the evolutionary optimum may be to 
cooperate, because of standard kin selection considerations. Should we then expect 
evolution to produce irrational behaviour? Perhaps, but alternatively evolution may 
simply produce people who care about the welfare of their kin; this would re-align 
individual rationality and evolutionarily optimality. And evolution seems to have 
actually achieved this. In the case of risk, individual rationality and evolutionary 
optimality might also be restored by suitably modifying people’s preferences, i.e. 
making them care about their relative fitness. But this will be much harder for 
evolution to pull off – for keeping track of relative fitness is at the very least 
cognitively demanding, and probably outright impossible for most organisms. 
 If this is correct, then it is quite plausible that evolution will tend to produce 
creatures that violate EU maximisation. Of course, this does not show that the specific 
patterns of EU violation discovered by behavioural economists can be given an 
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evolutionary rationale; whether that can be shown is an open question, requiring 
further work. But the foregoing considerations do suggest that it is a real possibility.   
 
8. Conclusion 
This paper has explored connections, both thematic and formal, between the 
economic and evolutionary theories of choice in the face of risk. That such 
connections exist is not surprising, given that optimization is central to both bodies of 
theory, but there have been relatively few attempts to explore the connections in 
detail. I have argued that the link is strongest, surprisingly, between evolution and 
non-EU theory; and in particular that there is a remarkable evolutionary analogue of 
the distinction between diminishing marginal utility and ‘real’ risk aversion, a 
distinction that cannot be drawn in orthodox EU theory. Further work will be needed 
to establish whether the specific versions of non-EU theory currently in vogue, e.g. 
prospect theory, rank-dependent utility etc. can be given an evolutionary foundation. 
Whatever the answer, I hope to have shown that the conceptual connections between 
rational choice theory and evolution are interesting and worthy of exploration. 
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